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This issue of the European Journal of Probation provides us with 
contemporary, considered and thoughtful analyses of the development of 
electronic monitoring (EM) in the context of penal sanctions and measures in 
5 jurisdictions: Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Scotland. 
The guest editor of this special issue – Professor Kristel Beyens – deserves 
great credit for pulling together such an interesting and important collection of 
papers. She has asked me – as someone deeply interested in penal 
supervision but to some extent detached debates about EM – to offer some 
closing reflections. In what follows, I try to do that, not through any attempt to 
synthesise the analyses of these excellent papers, but rather simply by 
sharing the thoughts and questions they provoked in this reader. 
 
Perhaps the obvious place to start is with my ‘detachment’ hitherto from EM. 
Despite the encouragement of wiser colleagues (like Mike Nellis and Kristel 
Beyens) to engage more with EM in my work on supervision, I have always 
been hesitant. On the one hand, like everyone else, I find it impossible to 
dispute the important influence of technologies on social (and therefore penal) 
policies and practices – and on the evolution of social life and social control in 
late-modernity. To make this case, I need only examine the way that my own 
life has been progressively re-framed by new technologies. My smartphone is 
my guide and my guard -- and the glue that, in one sense, fixes together my 
social and personal relations. In fact, this single handheld device digitally 
mediates most of my social relations. It’s not that I don’t have an ‘analogue 
life’ where I meet and relate to ‘real’ people in the flesh; rather, it is that even 
those interactions are planned, ordered and facilitated by that device. So I 
shudder at the fearful prospect of the loss of my smartphone, even if I also 
sometimes resent its omnipresence and fear its omniscience: Better than any 
person perhaps, it knows (and records) my plans, my contacts, my 
movements, my curiosities, my purchases, my networks, etc. Yes, I can 
silence its tones and alerts, but even then I hover around it -- curious as to the 
digital ‘action’ that I might be missing. And the digital world does seem to be 
where most of the action is.  
 
Even so, when it comes to thinking about penal supervision, perhaps like 
many probation academics and practitioners of my generation (or older), the 
centrality of human-human interactions and relationships has been drilled into 
me, both in my professional training (as a social worker), in my professional 
experience (as a social worker and as an academic), and through my 
research and knowledge exchange activities (e.g. Burnett and McNeill, 2005). 
These human-human interactions – according to this world-view – are where 
the ‘real’ action is. In particular – along with many others – I have been eager 
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to stress not just how social structures and cultures shape social (and penal) 
lives and practices, but also how human actors (in particular, practitioners 
within penal systems) can both resist and subvert and, by contrast, be co-
opted by and to governing rationalities and technologies (e.g. McNeill et al., 
2009). 
 
Indeed, an interest in how technologies and techniques are inscribed with and 
expressive of particular penal rationalities and sensibilities is commonplace in 
the sociology of punishment. Even if this interest has become most 
associated with him, it predates even Foucault; for example, Durkheim noted 
the crucial role played by the availability of a particular technology or 
architecture (specifically, the debtor’s prison as a place of remand) in the 
development of imprisonment and, with it, modern penality. In relation to 
probation and parole, both David Garland’s (1985) Punishment and Welfare 
and Jonathan Simon’s (1993) Poor Discipline offer telling analyses of how 
penal supervision emerged and then adapted within the continuously evolving 
rationalities, sensibilities, technologies and techniques of penal welfarism.  
 
Robinson, McNeill and Maruna (2013) provide a more recent account of 
probation’s continuing adaptations – and these adaptations are all 
‘technologies’ of a sort and employ technologies of various sorts. For 
example, the punitive adaptation requires technologies of visibility (the 
ubiquitous orange vest). The rehabilitative adaptation needs technologies of 
behaviour change (the cognitive-behavioural programme). The managerial 
adaptation needs technologies not just for rationing resources (through risk 
assessment) but also for audit and performance measurement (the 
‘standards’ and ‘key performance indicators’ and the infrastructure of 
information and communications technology that records and collates all the 
requisite data). Even the reparative adaptation needs a technology (or at least 
a practice) of accountability and of mediation (the restorative justice 
conference).  
 
In thinking about penal change, this special issue might help us to consider 
whether or not it is time to speak of a ‘surveillant’ adaptation of supervision. 
Robinson, et al. (2013) do discuss EM, but treat it less as a distinct and novel 
form of adaptation in its own right and more as evidence of more punitive 
and/or more managerialised forms of supervision. Yet, interestingly, several of 
the contributors to this edition, like other well-informed commentators (Nellis, 
2010), criticise a tendency in the development of EM to dichotomise 
‘supportive’ and, by implication, ‘human’ forms of supervision from electronic 
monitoring as, by implication, ‘mere surveillance’. Not only does that false 
dichotomy understate the growing evidence about the intensively surveillant 
and painful aspects of some forms of ‘human’ penal supervision (see 
Durnescu, 2011; Fitzgibbon, Graebsch and McNeill, 2017 forthcoming), it also 
neglects the human mediation of EM, both in the contact between monitoring 
officers and people under supervision, and in the humans who watch the 
screens in the monitoring centres.  
 
Equally importantly, the false dichotomy between human and electronic 
monitoring neglects the potential and the risks that may lie in their integration. 
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At the outset of this brief reflection, I noted my reliance on my smartphone as 
a digital mediator of my social world. I also noted my ambivalence about this 
situation. But whatever my ambivalence, I have accepted (even embraced) 
that particular technology, including some aspects of its surveillant capacities. 
For example, I choose to let it know where I am (or, more accurately, where it 
is), so that it can tell me how to get where I want to be. I choose to let it record 
other personal data about me (my weight, the distances I walk or run) so that I 
can monitor, plan and motivate my progress towards goals that I have 
chosen. 
 
The analogy breaks down, of course, over the fact that when it comes to my 
smartphone, I choose to embrace its utility and I have some control (or 
believe I have some control) over some of the information flows. I choose to 
trade some of my privacy for help with my daily life – and I do so freely and 
without (much) fear of the consequences of making other choices. A person 
compelled to submit to electronic monitoring -- or even consenting to such 
monitoring as a condition of early release or bail or probation -- is not making 
such a freely informed choice. Indeed, EM only ‘works’ as a means of 
encouraging compliance if the person subject to it believes in and is 
disciplined by its threat; to expose non-compliance and invoke the penal 
consequences. And EM only ‘works’ in terms of public and judicial credibility if 
they in turn believe that those subject to it are rendered compliant by this 
threat. There is something of a paradox here; EM’s credibility depends on 
high rates of compliance and, simultaneously, on swift and certain discovery 
and enforcement of non-compliance. The same is perhaps true of any and 
every form of penal supervision – whether mediated by technology or not – 
but EM adds to the risk of defaulting on supervision if it increases the risks of 
the discovery of infractions.  
 
That is one reason why the imposition of EM – like every form of penal 
supervision – must be subject to the tests of proportionality and parsimony. 
The two key principles advanced in the Final Report of the COST Action on 
Offender Supervision in Europe (McNeill and Beyens, 2016) are these: 
 
1. ‘Since supervision hurts, decisions about imposing and revoking 
supervision must be bound by considerations of proportionality. No one 
should be subject to more demanding or intrusive supervision than 
their offending deserves.   
2. Supervision must be delivered in ways that actively minimize 
unintended and unnecessary pains both for those subject to 
supervision and for others affected by it (for example, family 
members)’. 
 
These principles apply to EM no more and no less than to any other form of 
supervision, as well as to supervision that combines electronic and ‘human’ 
elements. Importantly, it is impossible to properly apply the first principle in the 
absence of knowledge about the how supervision is experienced in terms of 
its demands and intrusions; without that knowledge, the calculus of 
proportionality can only be uninformed. It is also impossible to properly apply 
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the second principle without knowledge about what forms of delivery minimise 
unintended and unnecessary pains of supervision.  
 
A good example of the complexity of these issues is provided by the contrast 
between EM with radio-frequency (RF) technology and EM with GPS 
technology. The former simply monitors whether a tag stays where it is 
supposed to stay at the appointed times. The latter – all being well -- tracks a 
tag wherever it goes. Courts – and even in some cases people about to be 
subject to EM – may then have a choice between seeking to constrain liberty 
or (also) to invade privacy. A GPS tracked person may submit to less privacy 
(e.g. 24/7 monitoring of all movements) if that means less restrictive curfew 
hours. But how exactly is a judge to weigh loss of liberty against loss of 
privacy in determining a proportionate and parsimonious penalty (especially in 
societies where many of us are already submitting voluntarily to 24/7 
monitoring of our movements by our smartphones!)? 
 
To take another, perhaps more controversial, example: Most probation 
advocates tend to assume that the experience of human supervision is likely 
to more congenial than standalone EM. But, similarly to the contrast in the last 
paragraph, imagine oneself compelled to choose between a ‘simple’ EM 
curfew between 8pm and 8am for 4 months and a year of fortnightly hour-long 
meetings with a human supervisor in an office on the other side of town, who 
is consistently late, or whose questioning you find intrusive, or whose 
judgment you find questionable, or whose advice you find patronising, or who 
seems intent on finding any excuse to breach your probation order or have 
you recalled you to prison. Perhaps if you like the place where you live and 
your own company, the choice would be easy. 
 
Without answers to these sorts of questions, we are ill-equipped to assess the 
significance of the rapid expansion of EM. We need to better understand what 
EM is – not as a set of technologies, but as a set of human experiences that 
are mediated and moderated, for example, by individual tastes, habits, 
circumstances, resources and opportunities. This is important not just to 
consider crucial questions about proportionate punishment; it is also vital to 
understanding EM’s potential (or otherwise) to support rehabilitation. Once 
again, several of our contributors recognise that potential; the Dutch and 
Australian cases seem particularly instructive in this regard. Yet our 
contributors also recognise the need for more research on whether, how, why 
and in what circumstances combining human support and electronic 
monitoring might support desistance from crime. 
 
Whenever such optimism about penal innovations in the community surfaces, 
we should hear the ghost of Stan Cohen (1985) warning us about the risks of 
‘net-widening’ and ‘mesh-thinning’ that commonly attend the development of 
systems of supervision. As a ‘successful’ penal innovation, EM’s most 
common and most effective selling point has been its cost-effectiveness 
relative to imprisonment. It is a technology that offered to meet a policy need 
related to prison population management. The same was and is true of 
probation itself, and of community service (McNeill and Robinson, 2015). But 
like most commentators on these two earlier forms of supervisory sanction, 
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the contributors to this edition – and the literature on EM in general – do not 
seem able to reach clear conclusions about whether or not EM has 
succeeded in diverting people from prison sentences. So, both in terms of 
cost-effectiveness and in terms of parsimony, the case for EM has not yet 
been made. 
 
When is EM proportionate? When does its use represent parsimonious 
punishment? Can it be constructive in supporting desistance? Can it divert 
people from prison? In a way, this special edition leaves us paradoxically with 
a sharper sense of the importance of these questions about EM but without 
clear answers to them. There are plenty of hints here – particularly about how 
and why national systems and contexts have shaped different uses of EM for 
better and worse. We have made progress therefore, but there is much work 
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